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THE LOST PURPOSE OF THE DOHA ROUND 
 
Raj Bhala
*
 
 
I.    TRADE LIBERALIZATION AS COUNTER-TERRORISM 
How should the world trading system be regulated? Not by using the 
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations as an example. Who should 
regulate the world trading system? Not the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Members, if their behavior in this Round, particularly that of most 
major, and several developing Members, is an example. 
The Members of the WTO have succumbed so completely to the pursuit 
of their commercial self-interest that the Doha Round has devolved from its 
grand launch in November 2001 as a counter-terrorist strategy to a 
monstrous mishmash of international trade law minutiae. The Round has 
lost its links to its original purpose, to fight Islamist extremism by attacking 
one (not the only, but one) of its causes: poverty. The correct idea was that 
multilateral trade liberalization could spur poverty alleviation among 
Muslim communities and countries, and integrate them more completely 
into the global trade order. Seeing and experiencing the benefits from this 
order, otherwise marginalized Muslims might be less susceptible to plotting 
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against the order and some of its non-Muslim participants. Why take a 
dangerous job as a lowly courier for Osama Bin Laden when the WTO 
system offers the realistic possibility of a lucrative career with an import-
export business and promises, in a legally binding manner, market access 
and a level competitive playing field for the merchandise of that trading 
house? 
That the Round was supposed to be about counter-terrorism through 
creating poverty-reducing opportunities was evident from its official name: 
the Doha Development Agenda, or DDA. It is the middle “D” that has gone 
missing. The Round has become like all others in the history of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), namely, a mercantilist exercise 
among the powerful, who cannot see much beyond the short term. 
To be sure, not all terrorists are poor (or Muslim), and not all poor (or 
Muslims) are vulnerable to extremism. Some terrorists, especially the evil 
minds concocting various plots, suffer less from forced material deprivation 
and more from a distorted sense of reality and a misunderstanding of faith. 
But, among their recruiting grounds are the poor, who suffer through no 
fault of their own from educational and occupational deprivations, and 
thereby are vulnerable to manipulation. Barely two months after the 
September 11
th
 terrorist attacks, deliberately holding their Ministerial 
Conference on the shores of the Gulf, in the Qatari capitol, the WTO 
Members understood a new multilateral trade round could not rid the world 
of the scourge of terrorism.
1
 But, along with “hard” counter-terrorism 
efforts, i.e., the use of force, a new round might be a “soft” effort. Fight Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban by proving they are lousy economists, that the world 
capitalist order does afford hope for a higher living standard and a more just 
distribution of resources. So, in brief, fighting terrorism through trade 
liberalization was the purpose of Members in launching the Round.
2
 
What has happened since November 2001? A few examples from the 
latest Doha Round negotiations texts, issued in December 2008, provide the 
answer: loss of purpose. Succumbing to their own selfish commercial 
interests, the United States, European Union (EU), and other major trading 
powers, along with several major emerging countries, particularly Brazil, 
India, and China, have collectively failed to keep the Round loyal to its 
                                                 
1
 See Warren Vieth, WTO Talks Open Amid Drug Clash; Trade: Under Heightened 
Security in Qatar, Poor and Wealthy Nations Prepare for Battle Over Protection of 
Patents, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001 (Bus.), at 1.  
2
 See Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schesms: Numerous, Technical, and Deep, 6 LOY. U. 
CHI. INT’L L. REV. 5, 169 (2008) (discussing the complexity of Doha Round proposals, 
including the pretence that trade liberalization would reduce the vulnerability of people in 
poor countries to radical Islamic extremism). 
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original intent. These draft modalities texts are long: the agriculture and 
non-agricultural market access (NAMA) texts are roughly 150 single-
spaced pages, with footnotes.
3
 They are convoluted: a rule purporting to cut 
a tariff or trim a subsidy is riddled with limitations and exceptions, which 
typically apply to a specific WTO Member or subset thereof.
4
 But while 
these dilated texts, with their turgid prose, make for difficult reading, the 
payoff is worth the effort. The payoff is to see the broad pattern from the 
bowels: the loss of purpose. 
Consider the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text.
5
 The 
original purpose of farm trade liberalization, which this Draft Text is 
supposed to provide, is clear enough. There are many poor Muslim farmers, 
including in the Cotton Four countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and 
Mali).
6
 Their incomes could be raised, and they could afford better 
education for their children (better, in particular, than some Islamist schools 
the curriculum of which is long on rigid religious education and short on 
practical job market skills), if trade in primary and processed agricultural 
products were freer and fairer. 
To be “freer” would mean duty free, quota free (DFQF) treatment to 
export markets around the world. To be “fair” would mean an end to trade-
distorting subsidies sponsored by the governments of rich countries. In a 
new environment, the farmers and their children would have no economic 
incentive, and no educational excuse, to entertain Islamist extremism or 
extremists. Therefore, the Draft Text ought clearly and expeditiously 
enhance market access for these farmers and free them from competing with 
the official treasuries of developed countries. Does the Draft Text fall short 
of fulfilling this purpose? To infer an answer, consider three revealing 
illustrations.
7
 
                                                 
3
 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, Revised 
Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4  (Dec. 6, 2008) [hereinafter December 
2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text], available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt_dec08_a_e.pdf; see also World Trade Organization, 
Negotiating Group on Market Access, Fourth Revision of Draft Modalities for Non-
Agricultural Market Access, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3 (Dec. 6, 2008) [hereinafter December 
2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text], available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/markacc_e/namachairtxt_dec08_e.pdf.  
4
 CHRIS MILNER ET AL., POLICY RESPONSES TO TRADE PREFERENCE EROSION: OPTIONS 
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 36 (2010) (explaining in depth the formula and guidelines 
that create a multitude of specific exceptions and limitations as applying to developed or 
developing countries with respect to agriculture and market access). 
5
 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 3.  
6
 See Raj Bhala, Discovering Great Opportunity in the Midst of Great Crisis: Building 
International Legal Frameworks for a Higher Standard of Living: Doha Round Betrayals, 
24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 147, 179 (2010).  
7
 For example, under the December 2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, the proposed 
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A. Example #1: OTDS8 
The December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text creates a base 
level for measuring all agricultural subsidies in a WTO Member, “Overall 
Trade Distorting Support (OTDS),” from which the Member is to impose 
cuts. OTDS is the sum of all farm subsidies.
9
 Accordingly, OTDS covers 
product- and non-product specific support categorized in the Amber Box 
(i.e., trade-distorting subsidies) and Blue Box (i.e., production set-asides, 
and possibly counter-cyclical payments), along with de minimis support 
(i.e., farm subsidies below a certain percentage of the total value of farm 
output). OTDS does not include agricultural export subsidies, which are 
subject to different proposed disciplines, nor Green Box subsidies, which by 
definition is non-trade distorting, and thus not subject to reduction 
obligations. 
The Draft Text calls for tiered reductions to OTDS.
10
 For instance, if a 
                                                                                                                            
industrial product tariff cutting modality is the Swiss Formula, which happily should result 
in bringing down higher industrial tariffs, and thus remedy to some degree tariff dispersion. 
But, with so many exceptions for individual WTO Members, or groups thereof, only about 
40 of the 153 Members would apply that Formula. For instance, there are country-specific 
exemptions, buried in the details of the Formula, for Bolivia and Venezuela. See December 
2008 Draft NAMA Modalities Text, supra note 3, ¶ 13.  
8
 This discussion is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line analysis of the 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 3, and World Trade 
Organization, Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities – Agriculture 9 (Dec. 6, 
2008, corrected Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter WTO Unofficial Guide], available at 
http://www.wto/org/english/tratop_e/agric_  e/ag_modals_dec08_e.htm.  
9
 See December 2008 Draft Modalities Text, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1–2.  Conceptually, it 
should not be necessary to define “OTDS.” As its name (“aggregate” measure of support) 
suggests, the first figure, AMS, is supposed to capture the sum total of subsidies a Member 
provides to its farm sector. This figure does not do so, however, because (via the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture), it excludes De Minimis and Blue Box payments. See RAJ 
BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE chs. 
45–46 (3d ed. 2008). Hence, OTDS is closer to the truly aggregate measure of support that 
AMS ought to be, but for legally-permissible exemptions from AMS. To be sure, it is not 
perfectly all-inclusive. 
Under certain Doha Round proposals, De Minimis and Blue Box subsidies would 
remain largely exempt from cuts. Including the second variable in OTDS reflected an effort 
to discipline, albeit modestly, the extent to which a WTO Member could exempt Product- 
and Non-Product Specific subsidies from cuts by dubbing them “De Minimis.” Similarly, 
under either alternative for the third figure (but most obviously under the second one), 
including the third figure in the calculation of OTDS was an effort to subject at least a 
portion of Blue Box Payments to cuts. 
 In sum, the essence of the strategy in defining a Base Level was to cap OTDS. At no 
point in the Doha Round did negotiators ever believe it would be economically viable, 
much less politically feasible, to eliminate all farm subsidies.  
10
 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 3, ¶¶ 3, 11.  WTO 
Winter 2012] THE LOST PURPOSE OF THE DOHA ROUND 5 
WTO Member is in Tier 1, defined by an OTDS of U.S. $60 billion or more 
annually, then it must cut its OTDS by 80 percent. If a Member is in Tier 2, 
meaning its annual OTDS is between $10 and $60 billion, then the Member 
must cut OTDS by 70 percent. A Member in Tier 3, with an OTDS of 
below $10 billion annually, must impose a 55 percent cut. 
The OTDS reduction commitment rule sounds simple enough. Applying 
it, the EU, with its hearty Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), is in Tier 1, 
and, therefore, would impose a cut of 80 percent to its base OTDS level of 
about € (euros) 110 billion. The U.S., which (along with Japan) is in Tier 2, 
given its generous legislated farm subsidy schemes, would reduce by 70 
percent its base OTDS level of $48.2 billion.
11
 But, are these cuts 
                                                                                                                            
Members would put their final bound OTDS figures in the appropriate part of their 
Schedules. Developing countries not required to make a reduction commitment would list 
only their Base Level OTDS in their Schedules. Two categories of Members would not 
have to list any OTDS figure in their Schedules – (1) a net food importing developing 
country that agreed not to sponsor Blue Box subsidy programs, and (2) five least developed 
countries – Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Nigeria, and Swaziland. See id. ¶ 10. 
11
 In January 2009, the U.S. notified the WTO of its domestic agricultural support 
expenditures for marketing years (MYs) 2006 and 2007. (MYs do not correspond with 
calendar years. Hence, for example, MY 2007 carried over into mid-2008, and even further 
for certain crops.) Those figures, with certain updates, are summarized as follows: 
 
● OTDS – 
 In MY 2006, $11.34 billion, and in MY 2007, $8.52 billion. The average for 
MYs 2002-2005 was $15.9 billion. The OTDS limit proposed for the U.S. 
(discussed in Table I, infra) is $14.46 billion. 
 
● Amber Box – 
 In MY 2006, $7.74 billion, and in MY 2007, $6.26 billion. In MY 2008, the 
figure was $6.25 billion. The Uruguay Round bound limit on Amber Box 
spending for the U.S. is $19.1 billion. The proposed Doha Round cut 
(discussed in Table II, infra) would lower this limit by 60 percent to $7.64 
billion. Interestingly, virtually all American Amber Box support went to two 
categories of products – dairy ($5.01 billion in MY 2007) and sugar ($1.23 
billion in MY 2007). 
 
● De Minimis Support – 
 In MY 2006, for Product-Specific De Minimis Support, $171 million, and in 
MY 2007, $237 million. For Non-Product Specific De Minimis Support, in 
MY 2006, $3.6 billion, and in MY 2007, $2.02 billion. For both MY 2006 
and 2007, U.S. De Minimis support was under the 5 percent limit (discussed 
infra). 
 
● Countercyclical Support – 
 In MY 2006, $1.49 billion, and in MY 2007, $893 billion. The U.S. 
classified countercyclical payments in the Amber Box, yet explained they 
were de minimis and thus exempt from Amber Box reduction commitments. 
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● Cotton Subsidies – 
 In MY 2006, $1.37 billion, and in MY 2007 $208 million. The U.S. 
classified cotton subsidies in the Amber Box. In MY 2006, over $1 billion of 
this support was not exempt from Amber Box reduction commitments. But, 
in MY 2007, the U.S. declared its cotton subsidies were de minimis, because 
the $208 million figure fell below the de minimis threshold of 5 percent of 
the total value of American cotton production (which was $5.2 billion). 
 
● Non- or Minimally-Trade Distorting (Green Box) Subsidies – 
 In MY 2006, $76.04 billion, and in MY 2007, $76.16 billion. U.S. spending 
in the Green Box jumped from $58.3 billion in MY 2002 to $71.8 billion in 
2005, and thereafter has essentially reached a plateau. Child nutrition and 
food stamp programs account for roughly two-thirds of American Green 
Box subsidies. 
 
See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Reports Less Trade-Distorting Subsidies for Farms in ’06–
’07, But Increase Expected, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 146–47 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
Note that the American classification of some subsidy schemes is the subject of deep 
skepticism in the WTO, particularly in light of the Appellate Body decision in United 
States — Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (adopted Mar. 21, 2005) 
(complaint by Brazil). This case is treated in Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review 
2005, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107–345 (2006). At the March 12, 2009 meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture, Australia, Brazil, and Japan questioned whether the U.S. could 
rightly classify counter-cyclical support as non-product specific, as such support effectively 
requires recipients to produce, or eschew, certain crops. These three countries also cast 
doubt on whether direct payments to farmers are decoupled, and thus properly classified by 
the U.S. in the Green Box, because some funding depends not on fixed and unchanging 
base acreages and yields (but rather requires crops not to be produced on base acres). See 
World Trade Organization, Committee Focuses on Monitoring Agriculture Commitments, 
Mar. 12, 2009, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news 09_e/ ag_com_12mar09_e.htm.  
 By way of partial comparison, the EU lists the following figures as per its March 
2009 and January 2011 WTO notifications: 
 
● Green Box Subsidies – 
As reported in the January 2011 notification, €62.6 billion for MY 2007–
2008, and €56.5 billion for 2006–2007, the largest share of which are 
payments under the EU Single Payment Scheme (discussed infra), namely, 
€31 billion in 2007–2008. As reported in the March 2009 notification, for 
MY 2006–2007, €37 billion, but included in this figure are Blue Box 
payments based on fixed areas and yield, or fixed livestock head, which are 
not subject to reduction under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture. For MYs 2004–2005 and 2005–2006, respectively, the figures 
are €24.4 and €40.3 billion. 
 
● Amber Box Subsidies – 
For MY 2003–2004, the EU reported to the WTO in December 2006 it had 
spent €30.9 billion in Amber Box support (far below its annual spending 
Winter 2012] THE LOST PURPOSE OF THE DOHA ROUND 7 
                                                                                                                            
limit of €67 billion, bound during the Uruguay Round), and €24.78 billion in 
the Blue Box. In its March 2009 notification, the EU again stated its Amber 
Box support for MYs 2004–2005 and 2005–2006, respectively, were €31.2 
and €28.4. The commodity product categories to which the EU gave the 
largest Amber Box payments in MY 2005–2006 were sugar (€7 billion), 
butter (€4.1 billion), apples (€2.8 billion), and olive oil (€2.6 billion). It 
subsidies for these products took the form of price support. In its January 
2011 notification, the EU said Amber Box spending dropped by 54 percent, 
from €26.63 billion in MY 2006–2007, to €12.35 billion in MY 2007–2008. 
As in previous years, sugar and butter were the largest recipients of product-
specific Amber Box support, so the large drop in such support was due 
mainly to cuts in sugar and butter subsidies: in sugar, a cut from €6.8 billion 
in MY 2006–2007 to €3.5 billion in MY 2006–2007, and in butter from €3.6 
billion in MY 2006–2007 to €2.7 billion in MY 2007–2008. 
 
● Blue Box Subsidies – 
According to the March 2009 notification, Blue Box support totaled €27.2 
billion for MY 2004-2005, and €13.4 billion for MY 2005–2006. In the 
January 2011 notification, the EU said Blue Box support declined by 9 
percent, from €5.7 billion in 2006–2007 to €5.2 billion in 2007–2008. 
 
See Daniel Pruzin, EU Notifies WTO of Sharp Drop in Trade-Distorting Farm 
Subsidies, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 150 (Jan. 27, 2011); Adriane Grace, EU Issues New 
Farm Subsidy Notification; Trade-Distorting Support Remains Stable, 26 INT’L TRADE 
REP. (BNA) 344–45 (Mar. 12, 2009); Daniel Pruzin, EU to Exempt $47 Billion from WTO 
Agricultural Subsidy Spending Caps, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 307–08 (Mar. 5, 2009). 
Note the clear pattern in the EU CAP of shifting support away from the Amber and 
Blue Boxes, and into the Green Box. This pattern indicates the EU is positioning itself for a 
Doha Round agreement in which caps on Amber and Blue Boxes constrain its spending in 
those Boxes, i.e., it is restructuring the CAP to ensure its farmers continue to get support, 
but of the kind that does not violate anticipated new international limitations. 
Conversely, the U.S. does not seem to be undertaking similar anticipatory structural 
reforms, and no optimistic inferences should be made from the above American figures. 
That is, just because these figures show a reduction in American farm subsidies does not 
mean the U.S. was ready to cut and bind its support at those lower levels. During MYs 
2006–2007, commodity prices were at high levels. Especially because of counter-cyclical 
subsidies, farm support expenditures fall when prices are high, and vice versa. Commodity 
prices collapsed in 2008, and global economic recession deepened. For example, between 
March and December 2008, soybean prices fell 20 percent, and corn prices dropped 25 
percent. Both crops are covered commodities under American farm subsidy law. Thus, 
American farm support spending, particularly counter-cyclical prices, is destined to rise. 
That is why the U.S. insists on significant headroom, i.e., subsidy cuts and caps that leave 
bound levels above actual expenditures. To use the academic jargon, at issue is future 
policy space for American farm legislation. Viewed in retrospect, the failed Ministerial 
meeting in July 2008 was a critical missed opportunity to clinch a deal on agriculture when 
farm product prices were high and subsidy payments low. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Notifies 
WTO of Sharp Drop in Trade-Distorting Farm Subsidies, 28 INT’L TRADE REP (BNA) 150 
(Jan. 27, 2011); Adriane Grace, EU Issues New Farm Subsidy Notification; Trade-
Distorting Support Remains Stable, 26 INT’L TRADE REP (BNA) 344–345 (Mar. 12, 2009); 
Daniel Pruzin, EU to Exempt $47 Billion from WTO Agricultural Subsidy Spending Caps, 
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meaningful for poor, Muslim farmers? 
The reduction obligations are imposed not on actual farm subsidy 
expenditures, but rather on bound, or ceiling, levels.
12
 The figures of €110 
billion and $48.2 billion are not what the EU and United States, 
respectively, actually spend, but rather the maximum amounts they could 
spend, if they chose to do so. The key, then, is whether they could raise 
actual outlays, despite cutting their ceilings—and, they could. America 
spends far less than $48.2 billion annually on OTDS. In recent years, the 
actual figure has hovered in the range of $6–10 billion, and with high 
commodity prices, expenditures are lower because some of the subsidies are 
triggered by, and designed to counter, low prices.
13
 
Clearly, when a developed country is asked to cut OTDS from a high 
bound base level, and its actual expenditures are well below that level, then 
that country has commodious head room to raise its actual expenditures. 
Hence, a poor Muslim farmer in Africa, Asia, or the Near East could be told 
that “America and Europe are cutting their farm subsidies,” when in fact 
they are not. They are cutting only their bound ceiling levels. Consequently, 
this farmer could witness increases in American and European support for 
products he or she also grows and tries to sell overseas, possibly in some of 
the same third country markets as his or her American and European 
competitors. If this scenario is the much ballyhooed poverty-alleviating 
trade liberalization effected by the Draft Text, then could the farmer be 
blamed for feeling disillusioned with the Doha Round or oppressed by the 
global trade order?  
 
B.   Example #2: Blue Box Subsidies14 
Along with OTDS reduction commitments, Blue Box subsidies are an 
example of why a poor, Muslim farmer might look askance at, and feel 
cheated by, the Doha Round negotiations on farm trade. This category of 
support, which emerged in the Uruguay Round (1986–1994), is defined 
                                                                                                                            
26 INT’L TRADE REP (BNA) 307–308 (Mar. 5, 2009).  
12
 WTO Unofficial Guide, supra note 8 (explaining bound, or ceiling, levels as related 
to the tiered reduction formula for cutting tarriffs). 
13
 See Raj Bhala, Doha Round Schisms: Numerous, Technical, And Deep, 6 LOY. U. 
CHI. INT'L L. REV. 5, 10 (2008) (noting that the United States spent $10.2 billion in 2003 on 
OTDS). 
14
 This discussion is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line analysis of the 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, and on World Trade Organization, 
Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities – Agriculture, (Dec. 6, 2008, corrected 
Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter WTO Unofficial Guide], available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/tratop_e/ agric_e/ag_modals_ dec08_e.htm.  
Winter 2012] THE LOST PURPOSE OF THE DOHA ROUND 9 
narrowly to cover only production set asides;
15
 payments to farmers not to 
produce on a certain portion of their land, or not to raise a certain number of 
livestock, for example. This support is de-coupled from output, and indeed 
aims to avoid over-production associated with subsidies directly tied to 
production.
16
 Historically, the CAP used production-linked subsidies, which 
resulted in mountains of butter and lakes of milk and wine. When pushed 
onto the world market, the increase in global supply depresses or suppresses 
prices, all to the detriment of poor Muslim farmers, especially if they are 
operating on thin profit margins that are erased by price declines. 
The obvious solution, which would comport with the original purpose of 
the Doha Round, is to cut dramatically Blue Box subsidies. While the Draft 
Agriculture Text does call for their reduction, it also revises their 
definition.
17
 The United States has championed an expansion in the 
definition of subsidies that qualify for Blue Box including: counter-cyclical 
payments (which, as their rubric suggests, counter the relevant product 
market price cycle by offering a larger subsidy to a farmer whose 
commodity experiences a greater price decline), as well as production set-
asides.
18
 The United States also succeeded in getting special and differential 
treatment for itself through a special rule that would allow it to increase 
product-specific Blue Box subsidies beyond that permitted for other WTO 
Members.
19
 In brief, Blue Box subsidies might be cut, but the dimensions of 
the Box are expanded, especially for America. After any cuts, the Box 
might not be vastly smaller than before. 
Once again, a poor Muslim farmer in a far-off land may be told that rich 
countries are slashing their production set-asides. But, the nuances of 
counter-cyclical payments may not be part of the story he or she hears. If 
that farmer witnesses price suppression or depression in his or her 
commodity markets, then can he or she be faulted for a less than 
enthusiastic sentiment toward the GATT–WTO system? 
 
                                                 
15
 See WTO Unofficial Guide, supra note 14, at 2. 
16
 See Michael J. Schumaker, Comment: Tearing the Fabric of the World Trade 
Ogranization: United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 32 N.C.J. INT’L & COM. REG. 
547, 562 (2007) (explaining how blue box subsidies are designed specifically for 
developing countries in order to limit agricultural production). 
17
 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 ¶¶ 32–
33, 35–37 (Dec. 6, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ 
agchairtxt _dec08 _a_e.pdf.  
18
 See Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Develish Details, Grand Themes, and 
China Too, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 118–19 (2009) (explaining how, in the Doha Round, the 
United States continuously sought a broader definition of the blue box that would include 
counter-cyclical payments).  
19
 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 17, ¶¶ 40, 42, 47. 
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C. Example #3: Cotton Subsidies20 
To be sure, developing and even least developed countries share blame 
for rules in the December 2008 Draft Agricultural Text that stray away from 
the founding aim of the Doha Round. Rather than stick to a unified, resolute 
position, many of them mimic the major trading powers. That is, on almost 
all negotiating topics, they have sought and obtained sui generis rules and 
exceptions. 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Venezuela are examples: they have 
helped themselves to special provisions on cutting farm subsidies for net-
food importing developing countries (NFIDCs).
21
 Not to be left out, 
Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Vietnam have successfully argued 
for special exemptions from obligations to cut farm subsidies on the ground 
they are the most recent of recently acceded members (RAMs) to the 
WTO,
22
 so they should not have to pay twice: once under their terms of 
joining the WTO, and a second time under the Doha Round. Then there is 
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Mongolia. They, too, get 
special exemptions from farm subsidy reduction obligations,
23
 not because 
they are very recent RAMs, nor because they have large Islamic 
populations. Their excuse is they are low-income countries with economies 
in transition from socialism to capitalism. 
But, there is one topic on which developing and least developed 
countries are not to blame: cotton subsidies. The United States has long 
known, and been told directly at the WTO by delegates from the Cotton 
Four, that there is a causal link between its cotton subsidies (and, to be fair, 
those of the EU and China), on the one hand, and suppression or depression 
of world cotton prices, on the other hand.
24
 
One study, issued in November 2010 by Fairtrade, a non-governmental 
organization (NGO), said the roughly $1 billion rich countries spend on 
cotton subsidies depress the income of cotton farmers in the Cotton Four by 
                                                 
20
 This discussion is based on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line analysis of the 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, and on World Trade Organization, 
Unofficial Guide to the Revised Draft Modalities – Agriculture, (Dec. 6, 2008, corrected 
Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.wto/org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_modals_ 
dec08_e.htm. 
21
 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, supra note 17, ¶¶ 4–5, 7–9.  
22
 See id. ¶ 33. 
23
 See id. ¶ 9 n.1. 
24
 See Jonathan Lynn, WTO Cotton Deal Will Do Little for Africa –Expert, REUTERS, 
July 15, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/15/idUSLF451163 (noting that nine 
studies have shown that the world cotton prices would be between 2 and 28 percent higher 
without subsidies).  
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10 percent, or $147 million in annual revenue.
25
 Conversely, Fairtrade pays 
premium prices for organic agricultural products, including cotton.
26
 
Farming families use the extra income to send their children to school (with 
an enrollment rate of 95 percent, compared to the national average in the 
Cotton Four of 43 percent), and has allowed the farming communities to 
build medical clinics.
27
 To be sure, the National Cotton Council, which 
represents American cotton producers, responds that cotton subsidies help 
over 340,000 people in several poor Southern states of the United States.
28
 
The European Commission makes a similar argument in respect of Greece 
and Spain.
29
 But, by no stretch of the imagination are the American or 
European cotton farmers either as poor or more numerous than their 
counterparts in the Cotton Four countries. 
Cotton farmers in the Cotton Four typically are poor and Muslim.
30
 
They operate on profit margins so narrow that a modest decline in world 
market prices pushes them into insolvency and drives them off the land. 
One recourse they have is to relocate to crowded, environmentally strained 
urban areas, and drive lorries, hauling cargo up and down West Africa. 
Some of them contract and spread HIV/AIDS, as a result of prostitution. Is 
this scenario in the national security interest of the United States (and the 
EU and China)? That is, does it make Cotton Four farmers more vulnerable 
to messages from Islamist extremists about oppression and injustice? 
The answer is evident, as is the policy choice that should be reflected in 
the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Text: eliminate cotton subsidies 
entirely and immediately. The Text contains no such rule. Rather, it 
contains a formula for their reduction.
31
 In a brazen triumph of short-term 
commercial self-interest over long-term national security interest, the 
United States has linked its position on cotton subsidies to that of China.
32
 
                                                 
25
 Mark Doyle, Campaigners Urge U.S. and Europe to Cut Cotton Subsidies, BBC 
NEWS, Nov. 14, 2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11753215.    
26
 See id.  
27
 See id.  
28
 See id. . 
29
 See EU cotton production could decline with decoupling, DELTA FARM PRESS (July 
17, 2006), http://deltafarmpress.com/eu-cotton-production-could-decline-decoupling 
(noting that the EU cotton producers receive the highest subsidies per pound and that this 
income support has been considered a form of economic support for the lowest income 
regions in the EU, including Greece and Spain). 
30
 See Raj Bhala, Discovering Great Opportunity in the Midst of Great Crisis: 
Building International Legal Frameworks for a Higher Standard of Living: Doha Round 
Betrayals, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 147, 179 (2010).  
31
 See December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4 ¶¶ 54–55 
(Dec. 6, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agchairtxt 
_dec08_a_e.pdf.  
32
 See Doug Palmer, Changed Market Makes WTO Cotton Deal Harder, REUTERS, 
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Subsidized American cotton farmers seek market access in China, which 
holds many of the world’s textile mills and apparel factories, and indeed is 
the largest market for cotton in the world.
33
 
American farmers and their spokespersons at the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) saw two impediments to such access. The change in 
the American Presidency following the November 2008 general election 
made no difference in perspective. The new Administration was headed by 
a President whose direct roots lay in Sub-Saharan Africa and who professed 
a desire to re-balance American foreign policy toward greater solidarity 
with the Third World. Still, the cotton subsidy issue was not about poverty 
alleviation or counter-terrorism in the Cotton Four countries. It was about 
commercial self-interest in, and economic rivalry with, China. 
The first impediment was China’s cotton tariff. At a 40 percent applied 
rate, it was high.
34
 Second, China also subsidized its cotton producers. 
Intoned Michael Punke, the Deputy USTR and U.S. Ambassador to the 
WTO, in May 2011: 
If people wish to discuss cotton, [then] everyone’s cotton 
programs must be on the table.... If we are going to have a 
discussion about cotton, [then] it must be a comprehensive 
discussion about all forms of market distorting practices. We 
would need to discuss both direct subsidization and other 
practices such as import licenses, sliding tariff scales, and 
reserves management – that produce very substantial levels 
of effective support for domestic cotton producers.
35
 
The Ambassador faulted China for reneging on its obligation to notify, 
since 2004, the WTO of its agricultural subsidies, including its support for 
cotton, and for starting or expanding trade-distorting cotton subsidy 
schemes.
36
 
                                                                                                                            
July 21, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/21/us-usa-africa-cotton-analysis-
idUSTRE56K6XZ20090721; see also Amy Tsui, China’s Imported Cotton System Violates 
WTO Commitments, Senators Tell Vilsack, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 323 (Mar. 5, 
2009).  
33
 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Earns Members Not to Get Stuck on “Deliverables” 
Package, Says LDCs Priority, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 886 (June 2, 2011) (discussing 
U.S. interest in addition market access); see also U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, China’s Agricultural Trade: Competitive Conditions and Effects on U.S. 
Exports, Inv. No. 332-518, USITC Pub. 4219 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/ publications/332/pub4219.pdf (noting that China is the world’s 
biggest producer, consumer, and importer of cotton).  
34
 See Daniel Pruzin, supra note 33. 
35
 See id.  
36
 See Daneswar Poonyth et al., The Impact of Domestic and Trade Policies on the 
World Cotton Market 5 (FAO Commodity and Trade Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
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On both points, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was prepared with 
a rebuttal. First, the CCP showed little interest in lowering cotton duty 
rates.
37
 Many cotton farmers in China are Uyghur Muslims. This restive 
population does not need another excuse to protest authoritarian, atheistic 
CCP governance, or ethnic Han dominance. Granting greater market access 
to American competitors surely would be one. Second, said China, 
American cotton subsidies reached $3 billion annually, thus depressing 
world market prices by 13 percent and injuring both Chinese and African 
cotton farmers.
38
 Moreover, despite the unlevel playing field created by 
American subsidies, the share of world imports of subsidized American 
cotton accounted for by China rose from 17 percent in 1999 to 43 percent in 
2005.
39
 America retorted with statistics it selected from a time period 
benefitting its case: there was a sharp fall in American cotton exports 
between the 2004–2005 and 2008–2009 crop years, a fall of 25 percent.40 
India, too, came in for scrutiny. By 2009, it accounted for 24 percent of 
global cotton production and 19 percent of global cotton exports.
41
 With a 
major textile and apparel (T&A) sector, the U.S. cotton farmers wanted 
T&A manufacturers on the Subcontinent, as well as China, to source inputs 
from them. 
Amidst this familiar Doha Round pattern of trading accusations and 
counter-accusations, Cotton Four countries became a sideshow, and the 
direct link between their interests in poverty alleviation and fighting 
terrorism was lost. The Sino-American deadlock precluded eradication of 
cotton subsidies, to the benefit of American cotton farmers, and to the 
detriment of their counterparts in the Cotton Four.
42
 As for Uyghur Muslim 
                                                                                                                            
8, 2004), http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/j2731e/j2731e00.htm (noting that analysts 
studying cotton issues have have the most difficulty estimating domestic subsidies for 
China due to China’s failure to submit notifications to the WTO).  
      
37
 See Razeen Sally, Chinese Trade Policy After (Almost) Ten Years in the WTO: A 
Post-Crisis Stocktake 10 (ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 2/2011), http://www.ecipe.org/ 
chinese-trade-policy-after-almost-ten-years-in-the-wto-a-post-crisis-stocktake/PDF 
(discussing China’s long standing resistance to U.S. pressures to reduce its cotton tariff). 
38
 See Daniel Pruzin, supra note 33. 
39
 See id.  
40
 See Doug Palmer, supra note 32. 
41
 See LESLIE MEYER ET AL., USDA, ECONMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, COTTON AND 
WOOL OUTLOOK 6 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://usda01.library.cornell.edu/usda/ 
ers/CWS//2000s/2009/CWS-09-14-2009.pdf.  
42
 See Edward Alden & Justine Lau, Cheap Cotton Threatens Chinese Farmers, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/81faf0c6-6698-11da-
884a-0000779e2340.html#axzz1asvjELsc (discussing issues that arose between the U.S. 
and China when an influx of cheap subsidised cotton from the U.S. resulted in a surge in 
imports to China benefitting U.S. cotton farmers); see also PBS.org, The Dying Fields, 
Global Cotton Industry: Cotton Subsidies and the World Trade Organization, Aug. 24, 
2007, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/the-dying-fields/global-cotton-
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cotton farmers, it is interesting to consider whether they, too, might benefit 
from an end to all American, European, and Chinese subsidies, and if so, 
under what conditions (e.g., maintenance of a high Chinese cotton tariff). 
 
II.    PURPOSE STILL LOST 
Following issuance of the December 2008 Draft Modalities Texts in 
Agriculture and NAMA, and over the course of negotiations in 2008 
through mid-2011, did the Doha Round regained its sense of original 
purpose? The answer is no. On April 21
st
 2011, for the first time in the 
history of the Doha Round, the Chairmen of all nine negotiating groups 
simultaneously summarized the work that had occurred to date. The groups 
and associated “Documents” covered: 
(1) Agriculture.
43
 
(2) NAMA.
44
 
(3) Services.
45
 
(4) Rules, which cover not only the conventional trade 
remedies of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duties 
(CVDs), but also the matter of fisheries subsidies and 
regional trade agreements (RTAs), specifically, transparency 
and systemic RTA issues.
46
 
                                                                                                                            
industry/ cotton-subsidies-and-the-world-trade-organization/1945/ (elucidating the Cotton 
Four countries’ struggle to gain revenue from the cotton exports in the face of large 
payments to cotton farmers in the U.S., China, and E.U., encouraging overproduction and 
depressed world cotton prices).  
43
 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, 
Negotiating Group on Agriculture – Report by the Chairman, H.E. Mr. David Walker, to 
the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/AG/26 ¶ I.A.6. (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 
2011 Agriculture Document] available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ 
negoti_tnc_21apr11_e.htm. This Document also provides minor typographical corrections 
to the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text. See id. ¶ 49. 
44
 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Market Access, Textual 
Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Luzius Wasescha, on the State of Play of the NAMA 
Negotiations, TN/MA/W/103/Rev.3/Add.1 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 NAMA 
Document], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_ texts11_e/ 
nama_e.doc; see also World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiation Committee, Report by 
the Director-General on His Consultations on NAMA Sectoral Negotiations,TN/C/14 (Apr. 
21, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e /dda_e / chair_texts11_e/ 
chair_texts11_e.htm. 
45
 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade in Services, Special Session, 
Negotiations on Trade in Services – Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Fernando de 
Mateo, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/36 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 
2011 Services Document], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_ 
texts11_e /serv_e.doc.  
46
 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from 
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the Chairman, TN/RL/W/254 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Rules Document],  
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_texts11_e/adp_subsidies _e. 
doc.   
Concerning RTAs, see World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Rules, 
Negotiations on Regional Trade Agreements: Transparency Mechanism for Regional 
Trade Agreements – Report by Ambassador Dennis Francis, Chairman, Negotiating Group 
on Rules, TN/RL/W/252 (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 RTA Transparency 
Mechanism Document], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dda_e/ 
chair_texts11_e/transparency_e.doc, and World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on 
Rules, Negotiations on Regional Trade Agreements: Systemic Issues – Report by 
Ambassador Dennis Francis, Chairman, Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/253 (Apr. 
21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_texts11_e/ systemic_issues_e.doc.   
As regards transparency, since December 14, 2006, the WTO has implemented on a 
provisional basis a General Council Decision Establishing a Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements (WT/L/671). Paragraph 23 of that Decision obligated WTO 
Members to debate, within the context of the Doha Round, whether the Decision should be 
made permanent. That is, Members had to consider whether the RTA transparency 
mechanism created by the 2006 Decision should be replaced by a permanent (and possibly 
modified) mechanism. See April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism Document, supra, ¶¶ 
1, 3. The Annex to the April 2011 Transparency Mechanism Document sets out the 2006 
Decision, with possible modifications in bracketed text. 
The thrust of the 2006 Decision was to enhance the transparency of RTAs, particularly 
in view of their proliferation, through early announcements and notifications, subsequent 
reporting, and technical support. See April 2011 RTA Transparency Mechanism 
Document, supra, ¶¶ 1–2 (on early announcement), 3–4 (on notification), 14–17 (on 
reporting), and 19 (on technical support for developing countries). The Annex to the 
Decision requires RTA parties to submit specific data about tariff concessions, MFN duty 
rates, preferential product-specific rules of origin, and import statistics, as well as 
information on services trade. The end result, at least in theory, should be improved 
compliance with the disciplines on RTAs set forth in GATT Article XXIV and GATS 
Article V. Other than the requirement that the WTO Secretariat provide technical support 
to developing and least developed countries to implement the Decision, particularly with 
respect to preparing and submitting data, there were no provisions tailored to poor 
countries. Likewise, there were no provisions to encourage the formation of RTAs among 
poor or Muslim countries, or to improve integration among existing RTAs. 
As for systemic issues posed by RTAs, the April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues 
Document merely recounted that discussions among WTO Members had focused on the 
“substantially all the trade” discipline in GATT Article XXIV:8(a)(i) (for customs unions) 
and XXIV:8(b) (for free trade agreements), and special and differential treatment for poor 
countries. See April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document, supra, ¶¶ 1–5. On the first 
issue, one-third of the proposals advocated a minimum benchmark to qualify as 
“substantially all the trade,” which would be based on bilateral trade (between proposed 
RTA partners), tariff lines covered (by the proposed RTA), or both, or would be based on a 
combined average of bilateral trade and tariff lines covered. Such proposals called for 
measuring the benchmark at the time a proposed RTA entered into force, and at the end of 
a transition period prescribed by the RTA. See April 2011 RTA Systemic Issues Document, 
supra, ¶ 4. On special and differential treatment, Members debated whether any 
flexibilities they agreed to should be placed in GATT Article XXIV, the 1994 Uruguay 
Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, the 1979 Tokyo Round 
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(5) Intellectual Property (IP), in particular, multilateral 
notification and registration of geographic indications (GIs) 
for wines and spirits, extension of GI protection to non-
alcoholic products, and protection of traditional knowledge 
and biodiversity.
47
 
                                                                                                                            
Enabling Clause, or both. That is, Members had reached consensus neither on the 
substance of flexibilities nor on their placement. 
Thus, the Chairman reported: 
8.  To conclude, it is clear that notwithstanding the mandate in Doha and 
the Ministerial Declaration in Hong Kong, China: 
(i) in essence, the objectives of various Members in these 
negotiations remain conceptually different;  an 
(ii)  gaps persist in Members’ positions on all elements 
proposed. 
9.  I reaffirm my advice to Members that unless they adopt a pragmatic, 
flexible and less doctrinaire approach to these negotiations it is unlikely 
that this impasse will be overcome. 
See id. ¶¶ 8–9 (emphasis added). 
In light of their failure to reach agreement on these two issues, it was surprising that 
the Members contemplated a post-Doha Round work program on systemic issues—unless, 
of course, they sought to defer hard bargaining until after the Round. See id.  ¶ 6.  
47
 See World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Special Session, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Darlington Mwape 
(Zambia) to the Trade Negotiations Committee, Multilateral System of Notification and 
Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits, TN/IP/21 (Apr. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter April 2011 Geographical Indications Document], available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_texts11.../trips_e.doc; see also World Trade 
Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Special 
Session, Attachment, Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical 
Indications for Wines and Spirits – Draft Composite Text, Revision, JOB/IP/#/Rev.1 (Apr. 
21, 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ chair_texts11_e/trips_e.doc. 
Hereinafter, April 2011 Geographical Indications Draft Composite Text; see also World 
Trade Organization, General Council, Trade Negotiations Committee, Report by the 
Director-General, Issues Related to the Extension of the Protection of Geographical 
Indications Provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPs Agreement to Products Other than 
Wines and Spirits and those Related to the Relationship between the TRIPs Agreement and 
the Convention on Biological Diversity, WT/GC/W/633, TN/C/W/61 (Apr. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter April 2011 TRIPs Article 23-CBD Document], available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e /dda_e/chair...e/dg_trips_e.doc; see also World Trade 
Organization, Intellectual Property: Geographical Indications Negotiations – Formal 
Meeting, Geographical Indications Draft Completed Swiftly but with 208 Differences (Mar. 
3, 2011), available at http://www.wto.org/ english/news_e/news11_e/ 
trip_ss_03mar11_e.htm.  
Reporting on the status of the negotiations and production of the nine-page draft 
composite text. The topic of geographical indications, while set in the context of 
intellectual property, also relates to agriculture. Though this topic is not addressed in the 
December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Agreement, many geographically-indicated 
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(6) Environment.
48
 
(7) Development.
49
 
(8) Trade Facilitation.
50
 
(9) Dispute Settlement.
51
 
                                                                                                                            
products are primary or processed farm products. See December 2008 Draft Agriculture 
Modalities Agreement § V.B. Negotiations on a proposed multilateral register for GIs pre-
date the Doha Round, having commenced in 1997 under the auspices of Article 23:4 of the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which states: 
4.   In order to facilitate the protection of geographical indications for 
wines, negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS 
concerning the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and 
registration of geographical indications for wines eligible for protection 
in those Members participating in the system.  
See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY 
AND PRACTICE – DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 533 (3rd ed., 2008). 
The fact these talks pre-date the Round (as do certain issues relating to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, discussed below), is shameful. It highlights how little 
progress WTO Members had made in well over a decade of negotiations on a reasonably 
focused issue. 
Mention of the on-going GI negotiations was included in Paragraph 18 of the 
Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha Round, thereby folding them into the Round: 
18.  With a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Council for TRIPS) on 
the implementation of Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the 
establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of 
geographical indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference.  We note that issues related to the extension of 
the protection of geographical indications provided for in Article 23 to 
products other than wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for 
TRIPS pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration.   
See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY 
AND PRACTICE – DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 637 (3rd ed., 2008). 
The GI topic is mentioned again in Paragraph 39 of the December 2005 Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration. For further discussion of the GI negotiations. See RAJ BHALA, 
DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (2008) (entry for “Geographical Indication”). 
48
 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Environment, Special 
Session, Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session – Report by the 
Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, 
TN/TE/20, (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Trade and Environment Document], 
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_ texts11.../envir_e.doc. 
49
 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Trade and Development, Special 
Session, Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development – Report by the 
Chairman, Ambassador Shahid Bashir (Pakistan), to the Trade Negotiations Committee, 
TN/CTD/26 (Apr. 21 2011) [hereinafter April 2011 Trade and Development Document], 
available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ chair_texts11.../devel_e.doc.  
50
 See World Trade Organization, Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft 
Consolidated Negotiating Text – Revision, TN/TF/W/165/Rev.8 (Apr. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter April 2011 Draft Trade Facilitation Text]. 
51
 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, Special Session, Special 
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As always had been true in the Round, the first four negotiating groups 
were the most important. Without a deal in them, a comprehensive Round, 
agreed to by all WTO Members as a single undertaking (i.e., that nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed, and that all Members ultimately must 
agree to everything), was impossible. 
Collectively, the April 2011 Documents gave a clear picture of what had 
been agreed to, and more importantly, what areas of disagreement 
remained. This picture was “vertical,” in the sense that the devilish details 
of proposals within each negotiating group could be seen. This picture also 
was “horizontal,” in the sense that the broad package, across all nine areas, 
could be appreciated. 
The WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, characterized the Documents 
as both “impressive and realistic.”52 Those adjectives were euphemisms. If 
they were “impressive,” then it was as much because of their cleverness in 
obfuscating simple trade liberalization issues with hideously complex rules, 
as it was for whatever economic gains they might happen to yield. As for 
the Documents being “realistic,” the more accurate assessment would be 
“depressing.” After a decade of negotiations, the Documents were long, 
convoluted regurgitations showing that nothing much had happened since 
the issuance of the December 2008 negotiating texts.
53
 Indeed, following 12 
single-spaced pages of discussion, the April 2011 Agriculture Document 
                                                                                                                            
Session of the Dispute Settlement Body – Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Ronald 
Saborío Soto, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/DS/25 (Apr. 21 2011) [April 2011 
DSU Report], available at www.wto.org /english/tratop_e/dda_e/chair_texts11.../ dispu_e. 
doc.  
Appendix A to this Report contained another Report by the Chairman, and Annex 1 to 
Appendix A contained the July 2008 “Consolidated Draft Legal Text (proposed as a basis 
for further work).” Hereinafter, April 2011 DSU Appendix A Report, and July 2008 Draft 
DSU Text, respectively. (Both the Appendix A Report and the Draft DSU Text bore the 
TN/DS/25 document coding number of the Report to which they were appended.) Also in 
April 2011, the Chairman issued Annex 2 to Appendix A, entitled “Thematic Overview,” 
which discussed various DSU reform issues (and which also bore the TN/DS/25 coding 
number). Hereinafter, April 2011 DSU Thematic Overview. Finally, at the same time, the 
Chairman published “Appendix B: Informal DSB Special Session Meetings (May 2010 to 
April 2010) – Chairman’s Summaries of Recent Work.” Appendix B (which bore the 
TN/DS/25 coding number) essentially contained minutes of meetings of the DSB on DSU 
reform. 
52
 World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee, Cover Note by TNC 
Chair, TN/C/13 (Apr. 21 2011), available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_ 
e/chair_texts11_e/dg_e.doc.  
53
 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Calls for Rethink on Doha Talks, Says Differences on 
Sectorals “Unbridgeable,” 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 686 (2011) (noting that the 2008 
Doha negotiations have been ineffective, as the current talks have reached an impasse).   
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simply attached the December 2008 Draft Agriculture Modalities Text. 
Likewise, following 22 single-spaced pages of discussion, the April 2011 
NAMA Document simply attached the December 2008 Draft NAMA 
Modalities Text. 
Also “depressing” was the lack of agreement on the cause of stagnation. 
Lamy said the entire Doha Round was blocked by a “classic mercantilist 
issue: tariffs on industrial products, the bread and butter of WTO 
negotiations since their inception.”54 True, sectoral negotiations within 
NAMA were a major obstacle. True also, some of the major trading powers 
behaved like mercantilists in these negotiations. But, as the Deputy USTR 
and Ambassador to the WTO, Michael Punke, indicated, by no means 
would the rest of the pieces of the Round fall into place if a NAMA deal 
were reached.
55
 Large, sometimes extraordinarily large, gaps remained on 
agriculture, services, and essentially all of the topics covered in the Round. 
Thus, the roughly 600 pages of Documents highlighted the difference 
between “work” and “progress,” between “motion” and “productivity,” that 
so often mars international organizations. The Director-General blatantly 
over-stated the strengths of the Documents in saying they represented 
“greater opportunities for the poorest [and] for the first time plac[ed] 
development at the heart of the global trading system.”56 
In truth, the April 2011 Documents marked the fact the Round had 
“entered the most serious crisis since a failed ministerial meeting in July 
2008, when trade ministers from key WTO members came close to 
clinching a deal.”57 
Moreover, the Documents could be faulted for their scandalous evasion 
of the purpose on which the Round was founded: fighting poverty, 
enhancing development, and thereby countering terrorism. 
Perhaps one of the most glaring examples came from the Committee on 
Trade and Development. Pursuant to the DDA, this Committee was charged 
with considering how best to monitor and evaluate special and differential 
treatment provisions in multilateral trade agreements. Such provisions, by 
definition, are supposed to offer more favorable treatment to developing 
countries, and still more favorable treatment to least developed countries, 
than to developed countries. After a decade of talks, the Committee had 
done little, as evident from the April 2011 Trade and Development 
                                                 
54
 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Criticizes WTO Chief Lamy’s Assessment of Doha Impasse, 
Says NAMA Not Only Issue, 28 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 724 (2011) (quoting from the 
TNC chair’s statements on certain nations’ disagreement on the issue of tariffs).   
55
 See id. 
56
 World Trade Organization, Trade Negotiations Committee, Cover Note by TNC 
Chair, supra note 52.  
57
 See Daniel Pruzin, supra note 53 (discussing the WTO’s July of 2008 negotiations 
which neared an agreement before ultimately falling apart). 
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Document. Its author, the Chairman of the Trade and Development 
negotiations, could not have been a stranger to the links between trade, 
poverty, and Islamist extremism: he was Ambassador Shahid Bashir of 
Pakistan. 
Had the WTO Members reached a consensus on a “Monitoring 
Mechanism” by which to check the extent to which developed countries 
were implementing special and differential treatment rules? No. They 
agreed the Mechanism should include not only all GATT–WTO texts and 
any Doha Round agreements, but also Ministerial and General Council 
Decisions.
58
 They also agreed the Mechanism should convene biannually.
59
 
But, they could not agree on what they would do. That is, there was no clear 
consensus on what “Monitoring” means, i.e., whether it is “meant to be an 
exercise in “transparency,” overseeing the implementation of S&D [special 
and differential] provisions, or a permanent negotiating forum on S&D 
provisions, even after conclusion of the DDA.”60 
In a proposed compromise, they waffled: “Monitoring” would not be a 
negotiating body, but it could make recommendations or proposals for other 
WTO bodies, and it will complement, not replace, other relevant WTO 
mechanisms.
61
 The Members also failed to make headway on special and 
differential treatment proposals for specific GATT–WTO texts. Put bluntly, 
the decade-long work of the Doha Round negotiating group most obviously 
entrusted with managing the link between trade liberalization and poverty 
alleviation, by ensuring the existence and operation of development-friendly 
rules, was singularly unimpressive. 
 
 
 
                                                 
58
 See April 2011 Trade and Dvelopment Document, supra note 49 (establishing that 
the Mechanism applies to all World Trade Organization Agreements, Ministerial and 
General Council Decisions). 
59
 See id. ¶¶ (c)–(d); Annex 1, ¶¶ 9, 12 (noting that WTO Members would reappraise 
the Mechanism 3 years after its operation, and thereafter as necessary). 
60
 See id. ¶ (b); Annex 1 (quoting the functions of the Mechanism upon which the 
members have already agreed).  
61
 See id. Annex 1, ¶¶ 3–8 (explaining that the Mechanism will evaluate and improve 
the implementation of the S & D provisions and initiate discussion with other WTO 
Bodies); see also Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the 
WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 405, 412 (2005) 
(stating that proposals for a new approach to SDT is “a process of multilateral monitoring 
and surveillance, with input by international development agencies…to ensure that 
decisions are subject to scrutiny and debate”).  
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III.  PURPOSE STILL REASONABLE 
In sum, the Doha Round has failed as an instrument of counter-
terrorism. Wandering far from the original purpose they professed to share 
in November 2001, the WTO Members – most notably, many developed 
and some less-developed countries – have championed their own 
commercial causes above their common interest in enhancing peace and 
security through trade liberalization. It is not the purpose that is flawed. 
Surely trade that is more free and fair can assist (along with other 
appropriate policy measures) in poverty alleviation. Surely enlarging the 
number of stakeholders in the global trading system, particularly among 
Muslim constituencies, is one (among other) ways to depopulate 
recruitment pools for Islamist extremist groups. This purposeful vision is 
self-evidently reasonable. Rather, it is the failure to implement this purpose, 
in the writing of new international trade laws, which is at fault. 
 
